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Abstract
The main point of this note is to provide a simpler and shorter proof of
the result on e¢ ciency in Olaizola and Valenciano (2017a) based on a result on
e¢ ciency of weighted networks in Olaizola and Valenciano (2017b). Additionally,
this shorter proof allows to rene the result by establishing new conclusions for
the zero-measure boundaries separating the di¤erent regions of values of the
parameters where di¤erent structures were proved to be the only e¢ cient ones.
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1 The result
The main point of this note is to provide a simpler and shorter proof of the result about
e¢ ciency in Olaizola and Valenciano (2017a) (in what follows O&V17a) based on
a result on e¢ ciency of weighted networks in Olaizola and Valenciano (2017b) (in
what follows O&V17b). In addition to this, the result is rened by establishing
new conclusions for the zero-measure boundaries separating the di¤erent regions of
values of the parameters where di¤erent structures are proved to be the only e¢ cient
ones, which are ignored in O&V17a. We briey review the model in O&V17a, and
the result about e¢ ciency in O&V17b. In order to minimize preliminaries and to
avoid redundancies, the reader is referred to these two papers for further details and
references therein.
1. The unifying model
O&V17a studies a unication of two seminal connections models by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000), eliminating the dichotomy of unilateral
vs. bilateral formation of links. In the bridging model a link can be created by only
one player (a weaklink) by investing c > 0 in it. Then ow occurs in both directions
with some degree of decay   0. However, when a link is supported by both players
by investing c each (a stronglink), the degree of decay is  (1 >     0). When
the decay in weak links is maximal (i.e.  = 0) we have Jackson and Wolinskys
connections model, where only strong links work, whereas when ow in weak links is
as good as in strong links (i.e.  = ) we have Bala and Goyals two-way ow model,
where strong links are ine¢ cient.
Let N be a set of nodes and let graph g represent a strategy or investment prole,
i.e. gij = 1 if and only if i invests c in link ij. For each pair of nodes i 6= j, let Pij(g)
denote the set of paths in g from j to i. For p 2 Pij(g), let `(p) denote the length of
p and !(p) the number of weak links in p. Then i values information originating from
j that arrives via p by `(p) !(p)!(p). Thus, the net value or aggregate payo¤ of the
network g is
v(g) =
X
i2N
X
j2N(i;g)
max
p2Pij(g)
`(p) !(p)!(p)   c(w + 2s); (1)
where N(i; g) is the set of nodes directly or indirectly connected with i, and w and s
are the numbers of weak and strong links in g. A strategy prole g is e¢ cient if it
maximizes the net value. Then the following result is proved:
Proposition 1 (Olaizola and Valenciano, 2017a) If the net value is given by (1) with
0   <  < 1, then the only e¢ cient networks, depending on the value of the parame-
ters (c; ; ; n), are the empty network, the complete network and the star network, in
both cases with all the links of the same strength: either all weak or all strong, except
perhaps in the boundaries separating the di¤erent regions where each of these structures
is the only e¢ cient one.
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In fact, Prop.1 in O&V17a says more, because it species the complicated map
corresponding to the di¤erent congurations of values of the four parameters for which
each of the ve architectures is the only e¢ cient one. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 above,
summarizes the most important part of the message: As in Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) and in Bala and Goyal (2000), the only nonempty e¢ cient structures continue
to be complete and star networks with all their links of the same strength, except
perhaps for a zero-measure set of values of the parameters, but nothing is said about
these boundaries, beyond that a tie of di¤erent e¢ cient structures occurs. In spite of
the richer variety of feasible structures in this model, possibly combining weak and
strong links which complicates considerably the proofs, no mixed structure appears
to be e¢ cient for any value of the parameters. The sentence between quotation marks
is literally in O&V17a, as the proof takes there 7 lemmas and 9 pages. Hence the
interest of providing a shorter proof. Moreover, as the new proof shows, some other
structures arise as e¢ cient within this zero-measure region.
2. E¢ ciency of weighted networks
O&V17b addresses the question of a planner whose objective is to form an e¢ cient
network in the sense of maximizing social welfare or aggregate utility of a set N of
nodes. It is assumed that an investment of c > 0 in a link creates a link of strength
(c), where  is a link-formation technology, i.e. a non decreasing map  : R+ ! [0; 1)
s.t. (0) = 0. Thus an investment vector c = (cij)ij2N2 (where N2 denotes the set
of subsets of N of cardinality 2 and ij = fi; jg), gives rise to a weighted network
gc = (gcij)ij2N2, with g
c
ij = (cij): It is assumed that a weighted network generates a
net value v(gc) for each node in accordance with a set of assumptions (Assumptions
1-4) that we omit here, but, as is pointed out there, the unifying model in O&V17a
satises them all. Then the following result is established in O&V17b:
Proposition 2 (Olaizola and Valenciano, 2017b) Under Assumptions 1-4, for any
link-formation technology , any network is dominated either by the empty network or
by a connected dominant nested split graph (DNSG) network.
Denition 1 A nested split graph (NSG) is an undirected (weighted or not) graph such
that Nd(i; g)  Nd(j; g)) Nd(i; g)  Nd(j; g) [ fjg: (2)
In other words, the adjacency matrix of g is a symmetric matrix such that, for a
certain renumbering of the nodes, each row consists of a sequence of non-zero entries
(apart from those in the main diagonal) followed by zeros, and the number of nonzero
entries in each row is not greater than in the preceding row. An NSG-network is
dominant if in addition satises the following denition in terms of the triangular
matrix T (g) above the main diagonal of 0-entries in adjacency matrix, i.e. T (g) :=
(gij)i<j:1
1In Olaizola and Valenciano (2017b) these networks are called strongly nested split graph (SNSG),
but we nd it more appropriate the term dominant.
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Denition 2 (Olaizola and Valenciano, 2017b) A dominant nested split graph (DNSG)
network is a weighted NSG-network g such that, for a renumbering of the nodes satisfy-
ing (2), in T (g) : (i) each row consists of a non-decreasing sequence of positive entries
followed by zeros; (ii) all positive entries in the rst row are greater than or equal to
any other entries; and (iii) from the second row downwards, non-zero entries in the
same column form a non-decreasing sequence.
2 A shorter proof
Now we proceed to prove Proposition 1 as a corollary of Proposition 2. Note that the
question of e¢ ciency in the unifying model is equivalent to that of a planner looking
for it by investing according to the following technology implicit in the model:
(x) =
8<:
, if x  2c
, if c  x < 2c
0, if x < c;
(3)
where 0 <  <  < 1. As mentioned before, it is immediate to check that the aggregate
payo¤ or net value of a network designed by a planner using this technology satises
all the assumptions under which Proposition 2 is established in O&V17b. This yields
the following rst corollary:
Corollary 1 If the net value of a network is given by (1) with 0   <  < 1, any
network is dominated either by the empty network or by a connected DNSG-network.2
Proof of Proposition 1:
In view of Corollary 1, it is enough to prove that any connected DNSG-network
with positive net value which is not a network with all links of the same strength, either
complete or an all-encompassing star, is strictly dominated by a network of this type,
except perhaps within a zero-measure region of values of the of the parameters. In fact,
it is immediate to check that in the region where c     2 and c = 2(   ), i.e. the
boundary separating the regions where the complete of strong links and the complete
of weak links are the only e¢ cient3, all complete networks have the same value and
are e¢ cient. Assume that g is a connected DNSG-network s.t. v(g) > 0. Note that for
technology (3) there can only be two types of links in g: strong links of strength  and
weak ones of strength , and we can assume w.l.o.g. that they are invested in 2c and
c respectively. Assume that the nodes are ordered so that conditions in Denitions 1
and 2 hold. Then the strongest link in g is g1n, and there are two cases:
Case 1: If g1n is a weak link, i.e. g1n = , then all links in g must be weak, given
its DNSG structure. In that case, g is dominated by a star or a complete network of
weak links, strictly if it not one of them4.
2A network g dominates (strictly) another g0 if v(g)  v(g0) (v(g) > v(g0)).
3See Figures 3, 4 and 5 in O&V17a.
4The brief proof is identical to that of the result on e¢ ciency in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
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Case 2: If g1n is a strong link, i.e. g1n = , two cases are possible:
Case 2.1: All links of the central star are strong, i.e. g1i =  for all i = 2; :::n.
Assume g is not a star, i.e. gij 6= 0, for some i; j 6= 1, nor the complete of strong links.
If maxf2   2c; 2   cg  22 (eliminating a direct link, weak or strong, between two
spoke nodes of the central star increases the net value), then g is strictly dominated by
the all-encompassing star of strong links. Otherwise, if maxf2 2c; 2 cg > 22; g is
strictly dominated either by the complete network of strong links (if 2 2c > 2 c) or
by the complete of weak links (if 2 2c < 2 c), or weakly by both if 2 2c = 2 c.
Case 2.2: The central star contains weak and strong links. In this case,
g12 = g13 = ::: = g1k = ; and g1k+1 = g1k+2 = ::: = g1n = ;
for some 1 < k < n. If there are no more links, Lemma 5 in O&V17a shows that then
g is strictly dominated by an all encompassing star either with all links weak or all
links strong. If any other links do exist, given the structure of DNSG-networks, they
must be weak. Assume that gij = , for some i and j s.t. k + 1  i; j  n. Then, if
2  c > 22, by connecting all spoke nodes of the central star with weak links would
yield a complete network of weak and strong links that strictly dominates g unless g
contains all such links, which in turn, a similar discussion to that of case 2.1 one leads
to the conclusion that it would be strictly dominated by a complete network with only
one type of links, unless all complete networks yield the same value (i.e. c = 2( )).
Otherwise, if 2 c  22, such a link is superuous, and g is dominated by the DNSG
that results from deleting all such links.
Assume then in what follows that
c  2  22 (4)
and gij = 0, for all i; j, s.t. k + 1  i; j  n, i.e. the submatrix of the last n   k rows
and n  k columns consists of 0s. There are two cases to be discussed:
Case 2.2.1: Assume that gij = , for some i; j s.t. 2  i  k and
k+1  j  n. If link ij is superuous, the elimination of all such links yields a network
that dominates g of the type considered in Case 2.2.2 discussed later. Otherwise, i.e.
if a weak link improves the net value of the connection of two nodes through two links,
one weak and another strong, i.e. 2 c > 2, then 2 c > 22, i.e. a weak link also
improves the net value of the connection of two nodes through two weak links. This
leads to the conclusion that g is dominated by the DNSG-network whose adjacency
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matrix is of the form represented in Fig.1-(a):
1 2 .. k k+1 ... n
1 0  ::   :: 
2  0     
:
...  0    
k    0   
k+1     0 :: 0
:
...    0 . . . 0
n     0 :: 0
1 2 .. k k+1 ... n
1 0  : : :   : : : 
2  0 : : :  0 : : : 0
...
...
...
. . .
... 0 0 0
k    0 0 0 0
k+1  0  0 0 0 0
...
...     . . . 0
n  0 : : : 0 0 : : : 0
(a) (b)
Figure 1.
Before proceeding, we consider the second case.
Case 2.2.2: Assume that gij = , for some i and j s.t. 2  i; j  k, while gij = 0,
whenever i or j is greater than k. If ij is superuous, by eliminating all such links a
dominant mixed star is obtained which is dominated by an all-encompassing star of
either strong links or weak links (Lemma 5 in O&V17a). Otherwise, this means that
paying for a weak link improves the net value of the connection of two nodes through
two weak links, i.e. 2  c > 22, i.e.
c < 2
 
  2 : (5)
This leads to the conclusion that g is dominated by the network whose adjacency
matrix is of the form represented in Fig.1-(b) and (5) holds.
In sum, there only remains to be shown that the two types of DNSG-network
represented in Fig.1 are strictly dominated. These two types of DNSG-network are
exactly the hybridnetworks introduced in the proof of lemmas 6 and 7 in O&V17a:
with the notation used there, gn k is represented in Fig.1-(b) and g

n k in Fig.1-(a).
More precisely, we have the following result that concludes the proof.
Lemma 1 Any network of type gn k or type g

n k is strictly dominated either by the
complete network of weak links or by the all-encompassing star of strong links, except
when c = 2(   ) =    2.
Proof. First note that in both cases (4) must hold, and if k = 0 then gn and g

n are
all-encompassing stars of strong links, while if k = n then g0 and g

0 are the complete
network of weak links. Consider rst a structure of type gn k for some k (0 < k < n).
Then the increase of value when passing from gn k to g

n k+1 and to g

n k 1 are
5:
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k) = 2   2+ 2(k   2)(   ) + 2(n  k)(2   ) + (k   3)c;
v(gn k 1)  v(gn k) =  (v(gn k+1)  v(gn k)) + 22   4 + 2  c:
5Note that only the contribution of pairs containing node k in one case, and k+ 1 in the other, to
the net value of the network change.
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Therefore, if v(gn k+1)  v(gn k)  0,
v(gn k 1)  v(gn k)  2+ 22   4   c > 2  22 > 0;
because, as  < ; (  )2 > 0, i.e. 2 + 2   2 > 0; and (5). In sum,
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k)  0 ) v(gn k 1)  v(gn k) > 0:
From here it follows easily that gn k is necessarily strictly dominated either by g

0 or
by gn.
Consider now a structure of type gn k for some k (0 < k < n). Then the increase
of value when passing from gn k to g

n k+1 and to g

n k 1 are:
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k) = 2   2(n  k + 1)+ 2(n  k)2 + (n  k   1)c;
v(gn k 1)  v(gn k) =  
 
2   2(n  k)+ 2(n  k   1)2 + (n  k   2)c :
Therefore,
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k) =  (v(gn k 1)  v(gn k))  2+ 22 + c:
Now, if  2+ 22 + c > 0 (i.e. c > 2  22), it follows, as for gn k, that
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k)  0 ) v(gn k 1)  v(gn k) > 0;
from which it easily follows that gn k is strictly dominated either by g

0 or by g
:
n .
Finally, if c = 2  22, then
v(gn k+1)  v(gn k) =  (v(gn k 1)  v(gn k)):
In other words, in the sequence from g0 to g
:
n the increase (decrease) of net value is the
same for any two consecutive structures. From which, it also follows that gn k is strictly
dominated either by, g0 or by g

n , unless all these di¤erences are 0. However, this can
only occur if in addition c = 2(   ) =    2, which corresponds to the intersection
of the boundaries of the regions where the star of strong links, the complete network
of strong links and the complete of weak links are the unique e¢ cient network6. For
this very particular conguration of values of the parameters all three structures and
also all gn k are e¢ cient and have the same net value.
In fact, in addition to proving Proposition 1, we have shown the following result
that completes Proposition 1 by rening the conclusions about the boundaries:
Proposition 3 If the net value is given by (1) with 0   <  < 1: (i) In the zero-
measure region where c    2 and c = 2( ) all complete networks have the same
value and are e¢ cient. (ii) In the zero-measure region where c =    2 = 2(   ) in
addition to all complete networks, all DNSG-networks of type gn k, including the star
of strong links, have the same value and are e¢ cient.
6See Figures 3, 4 and 5 in O&V17a.
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3 Concluding comment
As said in the proof, the two types of DNSG-network represented in Fig.1 are the
special networks introduced in the proof of Lemmas 6 and 7 in O&V17a, where we
called them hybrid structures because we were not aware of the existence nested
split graph networks by then. We introduced them as terms of reference to be able
to conclude the proof of the result about e¢ ciency once there only remained to be
explored the region of values of the parameters specied by conditions
maxf2   2; 2  22g < c < 2  22:
It is remarkable that these structures appear naturally as the only possible e¢ cient
DNSG-networks in the nal stages of the simpler proof provided here.
As mentioned in the rst section, Prop. 1 in O&V17a also establishes the precise
boundaries of the ve regions where each of the ve di¤erent structures is the only
e¢ cient one. In fact, it is easy to derive these boundaries once settled Proposition
1. Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that, even if only for very special congurations of
values of the parameters within these boundaries, other structures can be e¢ cient, thus
rening O&V17as conclusions.
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